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response to this crisis. I perceived a U.S. "strategy" to have our European allies lead efforts to resolve the crisis, as a step toward getting Europe to eventually take over the U.S. role in Kosovo. In investigating the inter-agency process, however, I found that there was no "strategic decision" to have the Europeans take on a greater role. Rather, the U.S. response was the result of interaction among:
--mid-level U.S. officials who saw a need to manage the crisis; --the President's desire to limit the U.S. role in the Balkans, including the number of U.S. troops; --the greater level of European national interests at stake; --mixed opinions within the U.S. Congress over whether the Albanians or Macedonians were to blame for the violence; --Albanian-American interest groups; --media coverage; --the desire that events in Macedonia not disrupt more strategically important efforts to bring stability to Kosovo and Serbia; and --events on the ground.
As fighting worsened, these factors pushed the United States to higher-level engagement to support EU and NATO-led efforts, while preventing the United States from seeking to lead those efforts.
Background of the Insurgency
There had been a few, intermittent terrorist attacks by ethnic Albanian rebels in Macedonia. KFOR noted that such action was not part of its mission to provide a "safe and secure environment" in Kosovo, and that the Macedonian government was blaming KFOR in order to divert attention from the internal source of terrorist activity. Both sides were partly right.
As noted by the Congressional Research Service, the timing of the NLA rebellion was primarily caused by "increasing radicalism of the disparate ethnic Albanian militant groups operating in Kosovo, Serbia and Macedonia, many of whom were linked to organized crime and regional smuggling rings. When the 1999 KLA-Serbia cease-fire agreement required the KLA to hand over its weapons to KFOR, the KLA established large arm caches in Macedonia. Macedonian KLA began supporting smuggling efforts for ethnic Albanian UCPMB insurgents in the demilitarized zone of Serbia, or fought and trained with UCPMB forces. When the NATO nations became more sympathetic to the new government in Yugoslavia after the downfall of Slobodan Milosevic, and began to talk about turning the demilitarized zone back to Serbia, the NLA began its uprising in Macedonia.
Although the timing of the insurgency was due to the Kosovo conflict, widespread discrimination against Albanians in Macedonia gave the rebels popular support. Ethnic Albanians in Macedonia enjoyed greater rights than minorities in any Balkan nation, but progress in ending discrimination had been slow. were motivated by a desire to split the country, and align with either Kosovo or Albania.
The intensity of the emotions tied to this debate meant that the NLA insurgency posed a real threat of escalating into civil war. The State Department participant said there was no deliberate decision to have the Europeans lead in responding to the crisis. Rather, it was the result of a desire to manage the Macedonian problem and a new Administration that did want to "own" that problem.
February through mid-March 2001: Working Level Management of a Crisis
Rather than being up front on the Balkans, the United States had been exerting its influence through NATO, the OSCE, the UN Security Council xxvi and the "Contact Group" (United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Russia and Germany), and close coordination with the EU. It was natural to use those same avenues to influence the Macedonian crisis.
Close coordination with the EU to resolve the crisis was an extension of existing cooperation on economic aid. Prior to the crisis, the United States and EU had teamed up to use the leverage of Macedonia's desire to join the EU to press the government to reform. In fact, many U.S. aid programs were geared to helping 
Epilogue and Conclusion
In August, the NATO team obtained NLA agreement to "disarm" by handing over 3500 weapons to a NATO force. To maintain pressure on Macedonian leaders, NATO delayed deploying this force until the mediators reached a political settlement in September. Britain led the 3500-member NATO mission to accept NLA weapons.
Germany led the follow-on NATO mission to protect EU and OSCE observers supervising the return of security forces to formerly NLA-occupied areas was led by Germany. U.S. participation in both missions was limited to logistical, intelligence and related support using troops already deployed to Macedonia for logistical support to KFOR. liv Many factors identified at the start of this paper limited U.S. participation in the NATO forces deployed to Macedonia in response to the crisis: the President's desire to limit the U.S. role in the Balkans; the greater level of EU interests at stake; and lack of media attention and support in Congress or among the American people for a more active role. The fact that events on the ground, however, escalated handling of the crisis all the way to President Bush has ensured that those working to resolve the crisis have been able to call in high-level U.S. intervention as needed to press all sides to adhere to the peace agreement. Although U.S. officials handling the crisis are concerned that fighting may resume, so far, peace has been achieved through a European-led effort strongly supported by the United States. The NLA took over Tanusevci the day after Macedonia signed an agreement with the new Serbian government to demarcate its border, a move encouraged by the United States and EU. The NLA falsely claimed that the border agreement changed the existing border. In fact, the agreement recognized the border between the two Yugoslav Republics as the official international border, but Tanusevci residents had faced increasing problems with Macedonian security forces over the previous year as Macedonian authorities concerned about security had begun enforcing the border and failed to address concerns of residents suddenly cut off from family, friends and natural markets on the Kosovo side.
vi The Congressional Quarterly had reported that, "Heightening U.S. involvement in the Balkans would be a setback for Bush, who came to office pledging to work hard toward extricating U.S. troops from the region. Earlier this month, the White House had announced that it was withdrawing 750 soldiers from Bosnia. At the time, Bush had again expressed hope that the United States could turn over its peacekeeping responsibilities to its European allies." (Miles A. Pomper, "Macedonian Unrest, Serbian Aid Force a Renewed Focus on Balkans, Congressional Quarterly Weekly, March 24, 2001, page. 676) The Quarterly further noted that early in the Administration, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, National Security Adviser Rice and "other top officials had talked of ending U.S. participation in existing missions in Bosnia and Kosovo." (Congressional Quarterly Weekly, June 23, 2001, page 15304) vii January 2002 interview with Confidential Source, State Department Official.
viii The Russian statement read in part, "The actions of the gunmen are aimed at provoking a crisis situation and destabilizing the international political situation in (Macedonia)…. The continuation of such a situation threatens the security and stability of the whole region." ("Russian Calls for Balkan Border Guarantees" RFE/RL NewsLine, February 27, 2001; see-270201) Russia, looking to influence policy in the Balkan's had long voiced Macedonian complaints that KFOR was not fulfilling the part of its UN mandate calling for regional stability because it was failing to prevent Albanian insurgents from entering Macedonia.
ix When Vojislav Kostunica gained power in Serbia, the UCPMB insurgency threatened to undermine a regime the United States and its European allies wanted to support. On March 1, NATO began brokering cease-fire talks with the UCPMB in order to allow a Serb return to the demilitarized Ground Safety Zone (GSZ). The UCPMB signed that agreement on March 12. A smooth hand-over of the GSZ to Serbia was the top priority of U.S. xiii In early March, the newly arrived commander of KFOR flew Ambassadors of NATO nations resident in Macedonia to KFOR headquarters for a day of briefings. He stressed the impossibility of sealing the border, the heavy strain that increased efforts to patrol that border were placing on KFOR, the priority being given to the Presevo valley. He also detailed why, except for people caught illegally crossing the border, KFOR could not interdict Kosovars supporting the NLA. Arresting Kosovars supporting the insurgency in Macedonia would appear to be taking sides against Albanians, would enrage the very Kosovars KFOR depended on to maintain order within Kosovo, and make KFOR troops a target for reprisals.
xiv Confidential Source xv The coverage was so distorted and alarming to the Macedonian populace, that the British and U.S. Ambassadors worked to get more balanced coverage. The British Ambassador convinced the BBC to send a more experienced reporter better able to discern when he was being fed one side of the story, while the U.S. Ambassador gave background briefings to American reporters. Biden used the hearing to stress the need for greater U.S. political engagement, "…my colleagues on this committee also recognize the grim fact that if we allow the Macedonian state to disintegrate, it could shatter the current peaceful relations in southern Europe among Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, Albanian and Turkey. … I am simply concerned that we are falling into the time-worn tendency of doing too little too late." During questioning, Biden indicated some support for a military role, "So I do not suggest that there is a military solution, but I would suggest there is no political solution without a military back-up in Macedonia." Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina) supported actions of the Macedonian government and condemned the NLA , "Until recently Macedonia was a model, albeit an imperfect one, for inter-ethnic coexistence and democratic rule in Europe's most war-torn region…. Ethnic Albanian terrorists are today using violence in an effort to undermine Macedonia's stability, Indeed, I am impressed with the restraint with which the Government of Macedonia has responded to these vicious attacks. Now I realize that there are legitimate Albanian grievances in Macedonia, but none warranting a turn to violence. introducing the resolution, McConnell noted "…the parties in Macedonia need to recognize that the United States will not intervene militarily, nor will we finance a war on behalf of either side….The United States will support a political settlement that upholds the rights of all citizens of Macedonia, regardless of ethnicity, and which preserves the political and geographical of the country." He also said, "The administration needs to give this precarious situation far more attention than it has thus far." xxv "Solana Calls for Political Solution in Macedonia," RFE/RL, March 20, 2001 xxvi The relationship with the UN Security Council was not only one way. U.S. policy was influenced by UNSC resolutions and debate. Macedonia took its case to the UN on March 4. By March 16, the UNSC had passed a resolution condemning "extremist violence…supported from outside the country." UN Special Envoy Carl Bildt of Sweden expressed "extreme alarm the situation in Macedonia and urged NATO to take action to seal Kosovo's border with Macedonia." On March 21, that view was incorporated into UNSC 1345, proposed by France, which condemned the violence being "supported externally by ethnic Albanian extremists," and called on KFOR "to further strengthen its efforts to prevent the transfer of arms and personnel across borders and to confiscate weapons within Kosovo." ( xxxii The President's statement said: "I strongly support the efforts of President Trajkovski and the Macedonian Government to uphold democracy and the rule of law. We encourage the government to act with restraint and to work closely with elected representatives of the Albanian community to address legitimate concerns, while taking the necessary steps to prevent further violence…. The United States is working with its allies and friends in the region to assist the Macedonian Government in countering the violence perpetrated by the extremists" ("Statement on the Situation in Macedonia," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, April 2, 2001. Volume 37, issue 13, page. 511-512) xxxiii Confidential Source Although the United States has an overall interest in the territorial integrity of states, in Macedonia there is a particular concern because the disintegration of Macedonia could spark a regional war. Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia have overlapping historical claims to territory in what is now Macedonia.
